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The second-order election (SOE) model as originally formulated by Reif and Schmitt (1980) suggests that, relative to the
preceding first-order election result, turnout is lower in SOEs, government and big parties lose, and small and ideologically
extreme parties win. These regularities are not static but dynamic and related to the first-order electoral cycle. These pre-
dictions of the SOE model have often been tested using aggregate data. The fact that they are based on individual-level
hypotheses has received less attention. The main aim of this article is to restate the micro-level hypotheses for the SOE
model and run a rigorous test for the 2004 and 2014 European elections. Using data from the European Election Studies
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1. Introduction
Standing on the shoulder of giants, the second-order
election (SOE) model was proposed by Reif and Schmitt
(1980) in an effort to understand voter motivations
and electoral outcomes in the first direct election of
the European Parliament (EP) in 1979. Reif and Schmitt
(1980) identified this supranational election as another
case of a ‘low stimulus election.’ The roots of this stream
of research go back to the US electoral context and here
in particular to efforts to explain the typical losses of the
presidential party in midterm elections (Campbell, 1966;
Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). Beyond the
US, there are other elections that do not directly or indi-
rectly fill the prime executive post of a polity, be it that
of a president, a prime minister or a chancellor. Among
them aremidterm elections in Latin America (see among
others, Erikson & Filippov, 2001; Remmer & Gélineau,
2003; Thorlakson, 2015) but also all sorts of subnational
elections—such as state elections in Germany (Dinkel,
1977, 1978) or provincial elections in Canada (Erikson &
Filippov, 2001).
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In their effort to understand EP election outcomes
and their difference to national first-order elections
(FOEs) and over time, Reif and Schmitt (1980, 9–15)
propose altogether six dimensions of variability. Among
them, the ‘less-at-stake’ dimension is the most impor-
tant. Based on this, the skeleton version of the SOE
model suggests that, compared to both the preceding
and the subsequent FOE result: (1) turnout is lower in
SOEs; (2) government parties loose; (3) big parties loose
too; while (4) small parties win; and (5) ideologically ex-
treme parties and protest parties win. Moreover, these
regularities are not static but dynamic—they are likely to
be inflated and deflated again as a function of the first-
order national electoral cycle. Most important here is
that (6) government parties’ losses are greater the closer
a SOE is located around the midterm of the first-order
electoral cycle (Reif, 1984, 1997; Reif & Schmitt, 1980;
but see also Stimson, 1976).
Most of the studies that followed the initial work
of Reif and Schmitt focused on testing the aggregate-
level predictions of the SOE model. These hypotheses
have mostly been corroborated (among others, Freire,
2004; Hix & Marsh, 2011; Norris, 1997; Reif, 1984, 1997;
Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2015; Schmitt &
Toygür, 2016; Teperoglou, 2010; van der Brug & van
der Eijk, 2007; van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996).
However, aggregate electoral outcomes do not them-
selves speak about the micro-level processes causing
them. Electoral results are silent about the determi-
nants of electoral behaviour. In their article, Reif and
Schmitt (1980) were not ignorant about individual-level
processes, but their respective hypotheses have received
less attention. This is not to say that nothing had been
done in that regard: Some scholars started to uncover the
micro-foundations of the SOE model (see in particular
Carrubba& Timpone, 2005; Clark&Rohrschneider, 2009;
Hobolt & Spoon, 2012; Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009;
Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011; Magalhães, 2016; Schmitt,
Sanz, & Braun, 2009; Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2015, 2017;
Weber, 2011). However, a comprehensive test of the
micro-level mechanisms of the SOE model is still lack-
ing, resulting in the fact that we do not ‘have a good
understanding of the phenomenon’ (Golder, Lago, Blais,
Gidengil, & Gschwend, 2017). Against this background,
we aim to contribute a succinct theoretical model for the
comparative study of voting behaviour in FOEs and SOEs,
and to test this model for two EP elections in all EUmem-
ber countries and in very different political environments.
In doing so, we provide a micro-model of inter-election
voting patterns and study the most relevant of them—
abstaining and defecting in SOE—at the occasion of the
2004 and 2014 EP elections.
2. A Sketch of a Micro-Model of SOE Voting
We start from the observation that the behaviour of vot-
ers in consecutive first- and SOEs is far from independent.
This is to say that some voters may support party a in
election B because they have supported party b in elec-
tion A (and because the two elections differ in impor-
tance, among other things). In order to sort this out more
systematically, it might be useful to begin with a distinc-
tion of the behavioural alternatives a voter faces in con-
secutive FOEs and SOEs. There are five of them. A voter
might: (1) vote for the sameparty in both elections; (2) de-
fect from her or his FOE choice in the SOE; (3) abstain in
the SOE while having voted in the FOE; (4) vote in the
SOE while having abstained in the FOE; and (5) abstain
in both. We claim that the second and the third of these
behavioural alternatives are the most informative when
analysing electoral patterns in EP elections because they
are at the base of often markedly different results be-
tween the two types of elections. Of course, this does not
mean that the same voting decision—such as supporting
the same party or abstaining in two successive elections—
must originate in identical sets of factors causing them.
We just propose thatwe aremore likely to unearth charac-
teristic motivational differences when we focus on differ-
ent decisions of a voter—such as defecting from the ear-
lier choice or abstaining although having voted previously.
It is the early insight of Angus Campbell (1966) that
a certain group of voters, he calls them ‘peripheral,’
are likely to abstain in low stimulus elections due to
a lack of mobilisation. These voters are characterised
by little political interest and partisanship. As a result,
this group of the electorate needs a particular stimu-
lus to participate in an election, while others need less
prompting because they either identify with one of the
parties or habitually turn out on election day (Franklin,
2004; Schmitt & Mannheimer, 1991). Regarding the mo-
tivations of abstention, the conclusions from previous
studies are inconsistent. Some claim that abstention is
motivated by Euroscepticism (the so-called voluntary
Euro-abstention; see Blondel, Sinnott, & Svensson, 1998;
Wessels & Franklin, 2009). Others argue that SOE absten-
tion reflects primarily a lack of politicisation and elec-
toral mobilisation (e.g., Franklin & Hobolt, 2011; Schmitt
&Mannheimer, 1991; Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2007, 2008;
van der Eijk & Schmitt, 2009). The latter explanation
might haveminor but significant repercussions for subse-
quent national FOEs (see for turnout Franklin & Hobolt,
2011; this has also been argued for vote choice by Dinas
& Riera, 2018).
Some voluntary abstainers are guided by sincere mo-
tivations. This can happen as a result of a certain scarcity
of arena-specific policy positions on offer (i.e., when no
viable Eurosceptic parties are running; see van der Eijk &
Franklin, 1996; Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2001). Other vol-
untary abstainers follow more instrumental motivations
and use abstention as a form of protest—against gov-
ernmental policies more narrowly conceived or, more
fundamentally, against the political supply more gener-
ally. Such strategic abstentions are expected to increase
around the midterm of the FOE cycle, when government
approval tends to be plummeting (Gélineau & Remmer,
2006; Mughan, 1986; Stimson, 1976).
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While sincere and strategic motivations may con-
tribute to differential abstentions, they are at the same
time the two main mechanisms responsible for inter-
election vote switching. ‘Sincere voting’ is when citizens
vote for the party (or candidate) that is most attractive
to them, either by way of socialisation and habit (party
identification), policy considerations (position issues or
valence issues and political competence), or candidate
traits. By way of contrast, a ‘strategic vote’—whatever
its motivation might be—is indicated by the support of
another than the first-preference choice option (much
of the relevant literature here is initiated by Cox, 1997).
Sincere and strategic voting is, again, not a behavioural
constant but a variable. Votersmay change theirmode of
operation from sincere (in one electoral arena) to strate-
gic (in another) and vice versa.
Reif and Schmitt (1980) distinguish two versions of
sincere switching. The first one is switching from a strate-
gic FOE to a sincere SOE vote choice. This can be moti-
vated by the desire of voters to express their true first
preference (in any kind of election) even if the chosen
party is not expected to gain representation (i.e., when
the first preference is a small party). This version of
switching is facilitated by the fact that the likely politi-
cal consequences of such a choice are limited in an EP
election because there is less at stake. The second type
of sincere vote switching occurs when SOE defectors sin-
cerely support another than their FOE party due to arena-
specific issues and policies. In the case of EP elections,
votersmay prefer one party on European and another on
domestic politics and sincerely support different parties
in the two electoral arenas. Running somewhat against
the original SOE model, this idea is substantiated by a
growing literature focusing on European policy and polity
issues as explanatory factors of vote choices in EP elec-
tions (e.g., Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; de Vries, van der
Brug, van Egmond, & van der Eijk, 2011; Hix & Marsh,
2007; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Hobolt & Spoon, 2012;
Hobolt et al., 2009; Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011).
The analysis of the different electoral patterns be-
tween FOE and SOE and in particular vote switching in EP
elections revealed a specific type of strategic voting, the
so-called protest voting or voting with the boot (Reif &
Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk et al., 1996). Strategic defec-
tors in EP elections signal discontent at the occasion of
a SOE with their government’s performance in the first-
order electoral arena. These signals can be issued in a
harder and a softer form. The harder version is actual de-
fection (former FOE government voters support an oppo-
sition party in a subsequent SOE); the softer versionman-
ifests itself in differential abstention (former FOE govern-
ment voters abstain in a subsequent SOE). This being
said, we note that (strategic) protest voting is likely to
boost around the midterm of the first-order electoral cy-
cle. During the ‘honeymoon’ period shortly after a FOE,
government parties will receive greater or near identi-
cal support in an EP election (e.g., Reif & Schmitt, 1980).
Regarding the later term of the national electoral cycle,
some argue (e.g., van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996) that the
closer a SOE falls to the next FOE the more likely vot-
ers are to opt for ‘strategic defection,’ while the original
statement of themodel expects a certain recovery of sup-
port for national government parties.
3. Micro-Level Hypotheses about Inter-Election Voting
Patterns
Considering that we analyse voter data from half a hun-
dred different electoral contexts (23 in 2004, and 28 in
2014), we expect amultitude of inter-election voting pat-
terns. While some SOE abstainers might lack mobilisa-
tion, others follow sincere and still others strategic mo-
tives in abstaining. SOE vote switchers are expected to
domuch the same: Compared to their previous FOE vote
choice, some switch due to sincere and others due to
strategic motives. These are our five main hypotheses
about inter-election voting patterns between first- and
SOEs (see Figure 1).
Four of themare conditional upon contextual factors;
for those we specify a couple of additional expectations
about contextual interactions. Specifying direct and in-
teraction effects, the following two figures display those
hypotheses in the form of path diagrams for each of the
dependent variables.
Starting with differential abstentions (Figure 2), our
first hypothesis (H1) predicts that SOE abstentions can
in part be explained by the lack of mobilisation: Those
with no partisanship and no interest in the electoral cam-
Vote
paern
Choice
mechanisms mobilisaon
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
sincere & strategic
SOE
abstainers
SOE
defectors
Figure 1. Basic vote pattern and choice mechanisms according to the SOE model.
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Figure 2. Expectations about differential abstention.
paign are more likely to abstain than others. The sec-
ond hypothesis (H2) predicts that abstention has also sin-
cere roots: EU sceptics are more likely to abstain in EP
elections than others. The third hypothesis (H3) speci-
fies strategic motivations to abstain and refers to FOE
government voters who are dissatisfied with its perfor-
mance. In accordance with most recent scholarship, we
expect those to be more likely to abstain than others.
This effect should be moderated by the distance of the
EP election to the midterm of the national electoral cy-
cle when government popularity is plunging quite gener-
ally (H3.1). Moreover, government dissatisfaction is ex-
pected to have a stronger effect on abstention when
there is only one party in government (rather than a gov-
ernment coalition of several parties), as the responsibil-
ity for government policies is clearer then (H3.2).
The second set of hypotheses addresses vote switch-
ing between the previous FOE and the EP election under
study (Figure 3). Our first defection hypothesis predicts
that voters with a first preference for a small party (i.e.,
if their party with the highest probability-to-vote score is
small) are more likely to defect because there is less at
stake in SOEs (H4). This sincere defection mechanism is
expected to be moderated by two trigger variables. One
is the ideological distance to the most preferred party in
terms of left and right: We expect that sincere defection
from a FOE vote choice is the likelier the smaller this dis-
tance is (H4.1). The other trigger variable is the distance
independent
variables
1st preference
party: small
FOE government
voter: dissasﬁed
H4 sincere
defecon
SOE/EE
defecon
distance
midterm
(H5.1)
single party
government
(H5.2)
Δ le-right
1st pref pty
(H4.1)
Δ EU int
1st pref pty
(H4.2)
H5 strategic
defecon
mechanisms moderator/trigger dependent
variable
Figure 3. Expectations about SOE defection.
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between self and party regarding support for European
integration: Here as well we expect that sincere defec-
tion from a FOE vote choice is the likelier the smaller
this distance is (H4.2). We note in passing here that ide-
ological positions enter the equation not as absolute val-
ues (like a ‘4’ indicating a centre-left position of a citizen)
but as the distance between that ‘4’ and the perceived
position of the most preferred party (which may stand
at ‘5,’ in which case the distance would be ‘1’ and very
small). This procedure closely follows the seminal work
of Downs (1957), who suggests that voting decisions of
citizens are guided by the distance between the ideolog-
ical position of a citizen and his or her perception of the
ideological position of relevant choice options. We come
back to this operationalisation in the Supplementary File
to the article.
Finally, the defection hypothesis is of a more strate-
gic nature. Here we predict that former government vot-
ers who are dissatisfied with government performance
are more likely to switch (H5). This effect should be
moderated by the shrinking distance to midterm (H5.1),
and by the clarity of responsibility for government poli-
cies (H5.2). These last two ‘strategic interactions’ are
identical to those put forward with respect to differen-
tial abstention.
4. Data and Strategy of Analysis
4.1. Data and Case Selection
In order to test these micro-level hypotheses, we
are analysing post-electoral voter surveys of the
European Election Study (EES; for further details see
www.europeanelectionstudies.net). As we aim at a com-
prehensive test of the micro-level mechanisms of SOE
abstention and vote switching, two different waves of
these voter surveys are analysed, namely the EES 2004
and the EES 2014. Among a much larger set of variables
in each study, these surveys contain a largely identical
set of indicators and are separated by a 10 years’ period
of turbulent political and economic change. As a result,
these two studies allow for testing the SOEs model in
vastly different contexts. The 2004 EES was conducted
when EU membership was expanded to include eight
newmember countries from Central and Eastern Europe
(plus Cyprus and Malta); this made it possible to study
the determinants of the vote for the new Eastern EU
citizens for the first time. Ten years later, the 2014 EES
study was conducted in a completely different environ-
ment. The shape of the EU had changed dramatically
during these ten years. At a most general level, the EU—
and the EP within it—gained greater legislative pow-
ers in many policy domains (Hooghe & Marks, 2001;
Schmitt & Toygür, 2016). From the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992 onwards, Europe has been moving into its post-
functionalist phase, which is characterized by a constrain-
ing dissensus over issues of European integration rather
than the permissive consensus of the past (Hooghe &
Marks, 2009; Hutter & Grande, 2014). More specifically,
the 2014 EP elections are held in a very different socio-
political context, provoked by the turmoil in some of the
EU member states following the global economic crisis
(Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Schmitt & Teperoglou,
2015; Talving, 2017). In the words of Reif and Schmitt’s
(1980) original statement of the SOE model, the specific
arena dimension—one of the six dimensions that are
at the base of differences between FOE and SOE elec-
tion outcomes—has changed dramatically between the
elections of 2004 and 2014. Despite these fundamental
changes, studies of aggregate election results conclude
that the character of the 2014 EP elections still follows
the SOE predictions (see Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2015;
Schmitt & Toygür, 2016). In the rest of this article we will
investigate whether this also holds for the micro-level
mechanisms governing electoral behaviour as specified
by the SOE model.
4.2. Dependent Variables
With regard to both participation and party choice, we
analyse vote recall (measured at one point in time) about
voting decisions in successive elections (conducted at dif-
ferent points in time). Their validity is less than perfect
because memory is fading with growing distance to the
event, and wishful thinking coloured by the opinion cli-
mate of the day is likely to take over (e.g., van der Eijk
& Niemöller, 1979; Waldahl & Aardal, 1982, 2000). Panel
data would certainly be preferable here, but they are not
available for 2004 and efforts to collect them in 2014
were less than successful. There is an additional com-
plication regarding the determination of inter-election
vote patterns. It originates in the fluidity of party sys-
tems, which is particularly aggravated in the new mem-
ber countries from Eastern Europe. The problem arises
when choice options in one election are no longer avail-
able in the next because parties in between have split
or merged or simply disappeared. The methodological
issues associated with the recall of the vote in multi-
ple elections (in one survey) must be expected to lead
to an overestimation of stable voters. Our painstaking
recoding of vote patterns in fluid party systems avoids
the overestimation of vote switchers as far as possible.
What we know about the over-reporting of electoral par-
ticipation suggests, in addition, that the relatively small
number of abstainers our surveys identify are real ab-
stainers, while many declared voters are true non-voters
(e.g., Bernstein, Chadha, & Montjoy, 2001; Traugott &
Katosh, 1979). In sum, there are reasons to believe that
the two categories of our dependent variable we are
most interested in—SOE defectors and SOE abstainers—
are rather crisp and clean, while stable voters—our ref-
erence category as presented above—are most likely to
be overestimated.
Table 1 presents the vote recalls in 2004 and 2014.
Stable voters—much as expected—are the strongest cat-
egory (33% and 31% respectively). While this points to-
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Table 1. Inter-election voting patterns (percent).
2004 2014 Difference
R chose the same party in both elections 33 31 –2
R chose a different party in one election 15 12 –3
R did not vote in SOE but in FOE 26 19 –7
R did not vote in FOE but in SOE 5 5 0
R did not vote in either election 21 33 +12
N of respondents 27856 29852 —
Source: EES 2004 (Schmitt, Bartolini, et al., 2009) and EES 2014 (Schmitt, Hobolt, Popa, Teperoglou, & European Parliament, Directorate-
General for Communication, Public Monitoring Unit, 2016)
wards the stability of inter-election voting patterns, we
find an astounding increase in the percentage of citi-
zens who abstained in both FOE and SOE in 2014 (33%
compared to 21% in 2004). This discrepancy could be a
true reflection of the reality in the two election years,
but it could also be a result of different sampling strate-
gies. We will not dwell on this, however, as we are in-
terested here in the determination of inter-election elec-
toral behaviour rather than in its distribution. We also
find a modest decrease in the percentage of differential
abstainers between the two EP elections (26% in 2004
and 19% in 2014). The number of ‘accidental’ SOE vot-
ers who abstained in the preceding FOE is equally small
(5% in both elections). These are the most remarkable
descriptive findings.
Based on these patterns of inter-election voting be-
haviour, we construct the two dependent variables of
this article, i.e., differential abstention and defection.
Both of them will take the value of ‘0’ for stable voters.
Differential abstainers are identified by the value of ‘1’
when respondents voted in the previous national elec-
tion but abstained in the EP election. Defectors are coded
‘1’ if the respondents chose a different party in the na-
tional FOE as compared to the EP election.
4.3. Independent Variables
We consider just a few independent or predictor vari-
ables at the individual level. In the case of electoral partic-
ipation, these are citizens’ party identification and their
interest in the EP campaign, their evaluation of EU mem-
bership, and the (dis-)satisfaction with the national gov-
ernment of former government voters. With regard to
party choice, we consider just two predictors: Whether
or not the first-preference party of a respondent is small
andwhether the respondent voted for the incumbent na-
tional government in the previous FOE and has been dis-
satisfied with its performance since. These independent
variables are not meant to do all the explanatory work
by themselves. Rather, they often become effective only
in conjunction with what we call trigger (i.e., moderat-
ing) variables. One of these trigger variables is whether
a country is run by a single party government. The other
trigger variable is the location of the EP election in the
national electoral cycle. Finally, with regard to the pre-
diction of vote choice, we expect the size of the first pref-
erence party to interact with the left–right distance be-
tween the respondent and that party, and the EU inte-
gration distance of the respondent and that party. The
details on question wording, variable recoding and de-
scriptive statistics for the dependent, the independent
and the trigger variables of our study are available in the
Supplementary File of the article.
5. Findings
The determinants of differential abstention and defec-
tion for the 2004 and the 2014 EP elections are reported
in Table 2. The table reports the three SOE mechanisms
as presented above, namely mobilization first, sincere
motivations second, and strategic motivations third. Due
to the hierarchical structure of our data, we test our
individual and system level hypotheses with multi-level
logistic regression models. Hierarchical multi-level mod-
els were specified with fixed and random effects. Fixed
effects were used in accordance with our hypotheses,
while random (country) intercepts account for the coun-
try clustering of our data. The quantitative variables in-
volved in interactions were centred at their means to
ease the interpretation of additive effects. In order to
make the interpretation of interaction effects more ac-
cessible, we also present them graphically as marginal
effect plots in Figures 4 and 5.
5.1. Differential Abstention
Our first hypothesis predicts that the decision not to cast
a vote in an EP election (although having voted in the pre-
vious FOE) is a result of the characteristic lack of mobili-
sation in these elections, among other things.We find H1
corroborated for both elections under study. A low inter-
est in the EP election campaign and the lack of partisan-
ship are strongly increasing the likelihood of abstaining
both in 2004 and 2014. Having said that, we note that the
effect of low interest in the EP election campaign seems
to be higher in 2004 than in 2014, while the reverse holds
regarding partisanship.
But the lack of mobilization is not the only factor that
contributes to the likelihood of abstention in these two
EP elections, there are also signs of sincere non-voting.
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Table 2. Determinants of differential abstention and defection in SOE.
Differential abstention Defection
2004 2014 2004 2014
Mobilisation
Partisanship (yes) −0.831*** −1.187***
(0.047) (0.048)
Interest in campaign (not at all) 1.163*** 0.940***
(0.051) (0.065)
Sincere Voting
Euroscepticism: EU membership bad 0.496*** 0.727***
(0.045) (0.043)
Less at stake: 1st preference party small 1.083** 1.003**
(0.070) (0.063)
Δ Left–Right to first preference party −0.009 −0.006
(0.036) (0.032)
Less at stake * Δ Left–Right 0.114** 0.107**
(0.054) (0.045)
Δ EU to first preference party 0.015 −0.032
(0.029) (0.023)
Less at stake * Δ EU 0.009 0.073**
(0.043) (0.033)
Strategic Voting
Dissatisfaction with gov. 1.237*** 0.339** 1.794** 0.725*
supported in last FOE (0.252) (0.151) (0.319) (0.431)
Dissatisfaction * electoral cycle 0.928*** 1.629*** 0.221 2.083**
(0.270) (0.242) (0.603) (0.318)
Dissatisfaction * coalition gov. −0.364 0.305** −0.403 0.423
(0.248) (0.146) (0.309) (0.426)
Dissatisfaction with government −0.185 — −0.180 —
(0.073) (0.069) (0.116) (0.093)
Government support in previous FOE −0.106 — −0.089 −0.179*
(0.073) (0.067) (0.120) (0.094)
National Context
Electoral cycle: distance to midterm 0.670 1.558** 0.553 0.335
(0.690) (0.745) (0.827) (0.427)
Coalition government −0.072 −0.221 0.295 1.158**
(0.580) (0.447) (0.595) (0.319)
Intercept −0.475** 0.070 — —
(0.209) (0.403) (0.557) (0.310)
Variance component (intercept) 0.702 0.880 0.559 0.244
Log likelihood –6,698.665 –7,341.947 — —
N respondents / countries 12,301 / 22 13,375 / 28 6,724 / 20 8,084 / 26
Notes: Entries aremultilevel logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses); * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Sources:
EES 2004 (Schmitt, Bartolini, et al., 2009) and EES 2014 (Schmitt et al., 2016).
Euroscepticism (i.e., negative evaluations of EUmember-
ship) increases the likelihood of abstaining both in 2004
and somewhat stronger in 2014, even if controlled for
mobilisation effects. This confirmsH2. Therefore, low lev-
els of electoral participation in EP elections are associ-
ated with critical stances towards the EU.
We continue with our hypothesis regarding strategic
abstention in EP elections. The findings in Table 2 reveal
that voters who previously supported a national govern-
ment party might have abstained in EP elections in or-
der to signal discontent with its performance. This kind
of strategic abstention in EP election is triggered by the
timing of an EP election in the first-order national elec-
toral cycle. According to this, voters of a national govern-
ment party who are dissatisfied with government perfor-
mance are more likely to abstain around the midterm of
the national electoral cycle (H2.1). Finally, H2.2 predicts
that strategic abstention is also triggered by the clarity
of government responsibility. In coalition governments
with less clarity of government responsibility, strategic
abstention is more likely to happen. This is only con-
firmed for the 2014 EP election.
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Figure 4. The marginal effects of dissatisfaction with the performance of the national government among its previous FOE
voters as moderated by the electoral cycle, for differential abstention and defection in the EP elections of 2004 and 2014.
Source: EES 2004 (Schmitt, Bartolini, et al., 2009) and EES 2014 (Schmitt et al., 2016).
5.2. Defection in EP Elections
Moving on to the results of sincere SOE vote switching,
we find that perhaps the most important factor of the
original SOE model, the fact that there is ‘less at stake’
in these EP elections, is confirmed at the micro level. We
hypothesized that voters whose first preference party is
small will show higher probabilities to switch their votes
from the previous FOE to the EP election under study
(H4). The results in Table 2 confirm this hypothesis; the
coefficient of a first preference for a small party is posi-
tive and very substantial for both the 2004 and the 2014
EP elections.
In addition, we hypothesized that the left–right dis-
tance to the most preferred and small party is one of
the triggers for defecting (H4.1). Because there is less
at stake, supporters of small parties might take the EP
election as an opportunity of ‘voting with the heart’ (van
der Eijk et al., 1996). The results as presented in Table 2
seem to refute this presumption at first sight. In both
elections, we find that the larger the left–right distance
to the most preferred party is the likelier it is to defect
from the FOE vote choice. But we must not forget here
that we are still talking about distances to the most pre-
ferred party: those who are ideologically very close to it
might not have defected previously to beginwith. Rather,
it seems that those with some distance have abandoned
their first preference in the previous FOE, and that these
voters are ‘returning home’ when less is at stake in the
subsequent SOE. In essence, then, our hypothesis H4.1
is not falsified, but nicely specified by our analysis. What
about the proposed trigger of support of or opposition
to EU integration (H4.2)? For the 2004 election we find
that the distance on EU integration does not significantly
moderate the voting decision of small party supporters.
Only in 2014, when the politicisation of EU integration
has increased, we find the same phenomenon as for the
left–right dimension: Small party supporters return to
their first preference in a SOE when they are at some dis-
tance to it on EU integration matters.
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Figure 5. The marginal effects of the ‘less at stake’ mechanism as moderated by the left–right distance (first row) and
European integration distance (second row) on defection in the EP elections of 2004 and 2014. Source: EES 2004 (Schmitt,
Bartolini, et al., 2009) and EES 2014 (Schmitt et al., 2016).
Are then SOE defections from the previous FOE
choice strategically motivated? Signalling discontent
with the incumbent government not only motivates dif-
ferential abstentions from former government voters, as
we have shown previously. It is at least equally important
as amechanism for defecting from the previous FOE vote
choice. Both in 2004 and in 2014 dissatisfaction with the
government party respondents previously supported sig-
nificantly contributes to their probability of defection in
the EP election. These signs of ‘votingwith the boot’ (van
der Eijk et al., 1996) confirm H5. If it comes to interac-
tions, our measure of protest voting is moderated by the
FOE electoral cycle only in 2014. Only in these elections
does the decreasing distance to midterm significantly in-
crease the contribution of dissatisfaction to the proba-
bility of defecting from the party voted in the previous
FOE. Therefore, the expectations formulated in H5.1 are
only partly confirmed. One explanation for this could be
that in 2004 there was not yet much of a cyclical regu-
larity in the political orientations of citizens in the then
eight new Easternmember countries (e.g., among others
Marsh, 2007; Schmitt, 2005). Finally, our hypothesis that
strategic signalling might be especially intense in coun-
tries with single party national governments (H5.2) is not
confirmed in either election. The clarity of responsibility
for government policies is not moderating the likelihood
of defection of dissatisfied FOE government voters.
6. Concluding Remarks and Perspectives
The formulation of the aggregate hypotheses of the SOE
model as originally proposed by Reif and Schmitt (1980)
aims to explain the differences in the electoral results
between FOEs and SOEs. While likely reasons for these
characteristic differences in the outcomes of these elec-
tionswere suggested early on, the easier-to-graspmacro-
level predictions of the model have long been in the cen-
tre of scholarly testing. Less attention has been given to
the micro-foundations of the SOE model, that is, the hy-
potheses about themotivations and intentions of individ-
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ual voters that drive their behaviour in a SOE—relative to
what they have done in the preceding FOE. In this article,
we summarise the hypotheses underlying the SOEmodel
and subject them to a rigorous empirical examination us-
ing the data from the EES 2004 and 2014 post-electoral
voter surveys.
At a conceptual level, we started by distinguishing
the behavioural alternatives that present themselves to
the citizens at a SOE following a FOE and identified two
of them which we claim to be critically important for the
empirical analysis of inter-election voting. These are dif-
ferential abstention and SOE defection. In the empirical
part of the study, we analysed the mechanisms for both
participation (differential abstention) and vote choices
(SOE defection)—something has hardly ever been done
in the scholarship available so far. Our main finding is
that it all happens at once: Mobilization as well as strate-
gic and sincere mechanisms affect electoral behaviour at
different levels of a multi-level electoral system.
Differential abstention is mostly due to a lack of mo-
bilization. Moreover, in 2014 (but not in 2004) we also
found support for our hypothesis on sincere abstentions:
those who are ‘opposing Europe’ (Szczerbiak & Taggart,
2008) were significantly more likely to abstain in the EP
election while having voted in the previous FOE. In ad-
dition, our analyses also identified signs of strategic ab-
stentions. Dissatisfied former government voters were
more likely to abstain, particularly in EP elections close
to the midterm of the national electoral cycle. Turning
to voter motivations for defection in EP elections, we
mostly found sincere mechanisms at play. Voters whose
first preference is a small party were foundmore likely to
defect than others, and first preference votingmeans sin-
cere voting. Moreover, our trigger variables were shed-
ding some additional light on the motivations of the de-
fectors: the left–right distance as well as the EU inte-
gration distance (in 2014) to the first preference party
was found to significantly moderate the likelihood of
voters with first preference for a small party to defect.
But there are also indications that SOE defection is of a
more strategic nature. Dissatisfied former government
voters were found to be more likely to defect than oth-
ers. This strategic defection is moderated by the distance
to the midterm of the electoral cycle (in 2014, but not
in 2004); defections increase with decreasing distance
to first-order midterm. However, our second trigger vari-
able for strategic defection—clarity of responsibility for
government policies—was not found to be moderating
defection in either election.
So we know that mobilisation and sincere and strate-
gic factors are all playing an important role in our un-
derstanding of differential abstention and defection: it
all happens at once. We might therefore conclude that
the decision to participate in an EP election is a more
multi-layered phenomenon than often portrayed, com-
bining both motivations from the national (domestic)
and the European political arena. This has been estab-
lished in two largely different electoral environments—
the enlargement election of 2004 and the post-crisis elec-
tion of 2014—and we therefore are confident that these
findings are reliable and can be found again and again.
Our results are important for the current and future
understanding of electoral behaviour of political actors in
multi-level electoral settings. We claim that they can be
generalised to previous and future EP elections as well
as other SOE at sub-national levels, like Canadian provin-
cial elections, Spanish regional elections, German state
elections, and so on. Multiple levels of a multi-layered
electoral systems are not isolated fromone another, they
are permeable and interwoven. This openness comes at
a price: As we have shown in this article, voters take their
behavioural cues from different levels. Moreover, politi-
cal parties present themselves more or less uniformly at
different levels in order to retain their credibility (which
means among other things to assume compatible policy
positions, see e.g., Braun & Schmitt, 2018).
It is often said that the EU is amoving target; no other
SOE-specific arena undergoes as rapid and profound in-
stitutional andprocedural changes than the EUdoes.Will
future EP elections with perhaps even starker changes
in this ‘specific arena dimension’—like the 2019 election
with its fundamental challenge of the EU by populist par-
ties on the right—still fit that picture?We claim that they
will, provided that citizens still perceive that there is ‘less
at stake’ in the EU electoral arena.
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